Blog: Glasgow researchers find racism against Romani on the rise since … – Third Force News

Romanians are the second largest migrant group in UK

A recent study by a University of Glasgow-led research centre shows Romanian migrants have experienced an increase in racism following the Brexit vote of 2016.

The study, carried out by the UK Collaborative Centre for Housing Evidence (CaCHE), explores how Romanian migrants’ inequalities of labour and migration status and their cultural values shape their housing experiences in post-Brexit/post-Covid Britain.

As part of the study, Dr Adriana Mihaela Soaita conducted interviews with a diverse range of respondents, over half of whom admitted to having experienced verbal abuse, racist language or indirect discrimination following the Brexit vote in 2016.

One respondent confessed to having been subjected to three separate instances of blatant racism and xenophobia. At the same time, another noticed an uptick in aggression towards those with an accent, once being told to “get off the bus and leave the UK.”

In 2017, Romanian migrants overtook those from the Republic of Ireland as the second-largest migrant group in the UK.

Professor Ken Gibb, Director and Principal Investigator at CaCHE, commented: “Dr Soaita’s important research reminds us of the challenges facing migrant workers during Covid-19 and in the context of the evolving changes brought on by Brexit’s realisation.

“These individuals, families and communities make a major contribution to British life, be it to the economy or to the dynamics of our neighbourhoods and towns. The experiences they tell us about should be widely read and reflected on by policymakers, practitioners and citizens.”

Dr Adriana Mihaela Soaita, Marie-Curie Fellow at the University of Bucharest, added: “As a Romanian migrant myself, I felt privileged in making other Romanians’ voices heard, showing their contributions to the UK society, their resilience during times of distress and their vision for social mobility in a society they praise for its meritocracy.”

The study also outlined the significant economic, physical, and mental health toll on Romanian migrants during Covid-19, many of whom were self-employed, employed in the hospitality sector or key workers.

Further, tightening borders meant they were separated from their transnational families, be they partners, children or parents.

Blog: Five things you may not know about Parliament and Brexit – UK in a Changing Europe

A new book – The Parliamentary Battle over Brexit – charts the dramatic story of Brexit in Parliament. Authors Meg Russell and Lisa James explore five key episodes.

  1. Some Remainers campaigned for a Brexit referendum

It is widely noted that David Cameron called the 2016 EU referendum on the assumption that Remain would win – and in an attempt to quell Eurosceptic dissent within his party. The associated failure to plan for a Leave outcome laid the ground for much of the turmoil of the Brexit years.

But Cameron was far from alone in hoping that holding a referendum might settle the divisive issue of Europe. He was initially subject to significant backbench pressures to stage a referendum. But some MPs who supported these efforts did not back Brexit, and indeed some later found themselves on the other side of the debate. Backbenchers were often responding to pressure from local voters and constituency associations. But some also, as one such interviewee put it, hoped that a decisive Remain victory might ‘lance a boil’ within the party.

This kind of optimism was not limited to the Conservative Party. Though Cameron’s predecessors as Conservative leader called for referendums on treaty change, the first mainstream party leader to propose an in-out referendum in this period was Liberal Democrat Vince Cable.

  1. Attempts to increase Parliament’s power over Brexit proved a ‘godsend’ for hard Brexiteers

Appeals to parliamentary sovereignty were a long-standing argument of Eurosceptics. But post-referendum, Parliament’s role in deciding the form of Brexit quickly became contentious.

Two key flashpoints illustrate. First, in the 2016-17 legal case brought by Gina Miller, the Supreme Court ruled that legislation was required to authorise the executive to trigger Article 50. In 2018, a statutory requirement for a meaningful vote in the House of Commons on the final Brexit deal was inserted into legislation by Dominic Grieve and his allies, against the government’s wishes.

Both initiatives were led by figures closely associated with the Remain cause, and both were opposed by Brexiteers, who characterised them as attempts to frustrate the referendum result. But in the end, Brexiteers benefited.

Two such interviewees independently described the Miller Supreme Court decision to us as a ‘godsend’; the court’s ruling that the Prime Minister needed legislative authorisation to trigger Article 50 locked her – and parliament more widely – into this decision, forestalling any subsequent attempt to revoke. The meaningful vote, meanwhile, would provide the means to block May’s Brexit deal.

  1. Brexiteers were key to the defeat of May’s deal

May’s deal suffered three heavy defeats in the House of Commons in early 2019 – with Leave supporters delivering the decisive blow. In the first vote, more Leavers opposed May’s deal than supported it. Most obviously in the third and closest vote, Brexiteer votes were pivotal. Of the 34 Conservative rebels, 28 – the so-called ‘Spartans’ – were Brexiteers associated with the hardline European Research Group (ERG). Had they and the Brexit-supporting Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) supported May’s deal, it would have passed.

May’s Brexiteer opponents also hindered her deal passing in this final tight vote in another way. Throughout this period, the Labour Party had faced a strategic dilemma. Working with May’s government might have provided leverage over the final Brexit outcome; but many Labour MPs had strongly Remain constituencies, and personally opposed Brexit.

Meanwhile others had voters who had tilted to Leave. This latter group in particular were tempted to support May’s deal on the third occasion. But by then, she was under such pressure from her internal critics that, in the words of one Labour interviewee ‘the danger is you could vote for it, and then it’d be overturned three days later by Boris Johnson becoming Prime Minister and doing something mad’. Despite major efforts from Downing Street, just five Labour MPs ultimately supported May.

  1. Parliamentarians tried to legislate against prorogation – but they made a crucial error

In mid-2019, with May overthrown and the Conservative leadership contest to replace her underway, some politicians began to fear that Parliament might be prorogued to prevent it from hindering a no-deal Brexit. The possibility had been mooted by leadership contender Dominic Raab, and while most candidates had vocally disavowed the suggestion, front-runner Boris Johnson had remained cagey.

The prorogation power is exercised by the monarch on the Prime Minister’s advice, with no Commons vote required, so opponents needed to show procedural ingenuity. The government’s Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill – required to keep the region’s institutions running without an executive – provided an opportunity. Rebels inserted amendments requiring Parliament to sit every two weeks to hear a report on progress in restoring power-sharing, effectively preventing a lengthy prorogation.

But the rebels made a crucial tactical error. A five-week gap was left in the reporting schedule, over the usual party conference period. Some Conservative interviewees claimed (perhaps unsurprisingly) that the loophole was included at Jeremy Corbyn’s insistence, though its origins are ultimately unclear. But it allowed Johnson to pursue a five-week prorogation – later ruled unlawful by the Supreme Court.

  1. Johnson planned to renege on his ‘oven-ready’ Protocol

In autumn 2019, Johnson proclaimed his renegotiated deal with the EU a triumph. In essence, he had traded May’s all-UK customs union for a border down the Irish Sea: choosing divergence between Great Britain and the EU over alignment between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Johnson’s team knew that this stored up problems for later. But their short-term priority was to persuade MPs to pass the deal – even if that meant suppressing the reality of the trade-offs.

Two groups were key. The DUP was implacably opposed to any border down the Irish Sea; to add insult to injury, Johnson had publicly told them he would contemplate no such thing. The other key group was the ERG – also concerned about the deal, but increasingly worried about the risk of losing Brexit altogether.

Members of both groups have independently reported that Johnson promised he would later renege on the deal in return for their support – apparently a promise key to securing the ERG’s votes. This is the deal that Johnson went on to sell to the electorate as ‘oven-ready’ in the 2019 general election campaign. Rishi Sunak has recently sought to resolve its problems via the Windsor framework, but it still lacks DUP support.

By Professor Meg Russell, Director, Constitution Unit, UCL, and former Senior Fellow, UK in a Changing Europe, and Lisa James, Research Fellow, Constitution Unit, UCL.  

The Parliamentary Battle over Brexit was published by Oxford University Press on 23 March. Click the link for further details about the book, and to purchase it with a 30% discount on the £25 retail price.

Blog: New grant aims to help Brexit impacted firms to enter new markets – Irish Examiner

A new State-backed grant has been introduced to help Brexit impacted Enterprise Ireland and Bord Bia client companies enter into new markets.

The Post-Brexit Market Growth and Diversification grant was formed to reduce reliance on Ireland’s closest exporting market and to also expose Irish firms to other areas where they can develop.

“We are aware that there are certain companies and sectors for who the new trading relationship with the UK has resulted in a decrease in sales to that market,” said Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment Simon Coveney.

“We want to help these companies to bring their products and services to new markets and to seek out new supply chain avenues,” he added.

In general though, exports to the UK have remained resilient since 2019.

“Irish food and drink exports were valued at €16.6bn last year. Given its scale and importance, the UK remains our top priority market, albeit operating alongside a clear market diversification strategy for product categories with over dependence,” said Bord Bia CEO Jim O’Toole.

The new grant has been developed under the Brexit Adjustment Reserve funding and negotiated by Ireland trade representatives and the EU Commission to support impacted industries post-Brexit.

Eligible companies for the grant have to demonstrate that they have suffered a 5% reduction in UK sales in 2020, 2021 or 2022 compared to 2019 levels.

The grant will allow successful applicants to receive up to 50 days of consultancy in developing a new market plan. The grant will be provided at a rate of 80% subject to a maximum grant of €36,000.

Firms that want to apply must complete a Brexit impact declaration form and submit their application by May 31. Claims must be submitted by 31st October 2023.

“Enterprise Ireland has assisted companies prepare for Brexit and adjust to the new trading relationship with the UK. Our ambition is to help build export-focused Irish business, delivering growth and jobs across all regions,” said Conor O’Donovan, manager, global communications and strategic marketing with Enterprise Ireland.

Blog: Rishi Sunak says Brexit deal ensures sovereignty for Northern Ireland – Jersey Evening Post

Rishi Sunak insisted that his new deal for Northern Ireland’s post-Brexit trading arrangements “ensures proper sovereignty” for the region, as he confirmed there would be no renegotiation.

The Prime Minister was grilled on the Windsor pact he signed with the EU despite opposition from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and some senior Conservatives.

Veteran Brexiteer Sir Bill Cash said Northern Ireland would be perpetually locked into EU laws and asked how that fitted with Mr Sunak’s support for the union.

He disagreed with Sir Bill’s assertion that the Windsor Framework does not represent the kind of union the people of Northern Ireland expect.

“I do think that it ensures proper sovereignty for people of Northern Ireland and corrects the democratic deficit because of the Stormont brake,” the Prime Minister said.

Last week, MPs voted in favour of regulations to implement the Stormont brake, a key part of the Windsor agreement, despite former prime ministers Boris Johnson and Liz Truss joining the DUP and hardline Brexit-backing Tory MPs in voting against the deal.

The deal was formally signed off with the EU later in the week.

But with no sign of the DUP being willing to return to powersharing, Mr Sunak was asked what happens if it is not restored.

He said: “I remain hopeful that we can continue to have dialogue with all the parties in Northern Ireland.

“I want to see powersharing up and running,” he said, adding that “that’s what the people of Northern Ireland need and deserve”.

The Windsor Framework ensures challenges posed by the Northern Ireland Protocol have been “dealt with” and provides a foundation “for us to move forward”, Mr Sunak added.

Mr Sunak also confirmed there would be no further negotiation with Brussels.

Simon Hoare, chairman of the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, asked him whether there was now a choice between the Windsor Framework or the existing Northern Ireland Protocol in its unamended form because “there is no scope for further negotiations with the European Union”?

The Prime Minister said: “In the interests of brevity, that is right.”

Blog: Brexit Britain must have Biden quietly chuckling to himself – The Telegraph

Nexperia, a Dutch subsidiary of China’s Wingtech, which is backed by Beijing, became Newport Wafer Fab’s second-biggest shareholder in 2019 but with nobody in Government paying attention, the threat wasn’t spotted.

Then, two years later, with the Welsh company struggling to pay its debts and faced potential bankruptcy, Nexperia launched a full takeover, which the Business Department has been desperately trying to reverse ever since.

The ponderous response has placed further strain and uncertainty on an already struggling company, prompted accusations that “the UK is closed for business” and left the Government facing possible legal action after Nexperia applied for a judicial review.

With the UK distracted, the White House is pulling out all the stops to turbo-boost domestic semiconductor manufacturing and ensure that America can continue to compete with China and Taiwan on the global stage.

During the pandemic, the US was quick to realise two things: the importance of microchips, and the fact that it was overly reliant on overseas suppliers. The resulting chip shortage crippled the American economy, forcing American carmakers to pause production; raised questions about critical military hardware; and led to fears about the reliance of its cyber-security capabilities.

Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo told a Senate committee that the US faced a supply chain crisis. “Not that long ago, America led the world in leading-edge semiconductor chips. Today we produce 0pc of those chips in America. That’s a national security risk and an economic security risk.”

The escalating threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan has further concentrated minds in the West. More than 90pc of the world’s advanced chips come from a single plant in Taipei, belonging to Taiwanese chip titan Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. 

It also makes about 90pc of the chips vital to products made by US tech firms Apple, Amazon, and Google; and a similar proportion of those used in US military equipment.

Biden’s response to Raimondo’s stark warning was emphatic – the signing of the Chips and Science Act, a comprehensive $280bn state support package

It included more than $50bn in government loans and R&D tax breaks to revitalise the American semiconductor industry by encouraging foreign producers to build plants on US soil. The European Union equivalent amounts to roughly €43bn of subsidies.

Blog: The butterfly effect: How the failure of a small US bank toppled a giant in Switzerland – Sydney Morning Herald

It was the losses Silicon Valley Bank realised when it was forced to sell almost its entire portfolio of available for sale securities that triggered the violent run on its deposits – $US42 billion in a day – that caused it to collapse.

The speed at which the bank failed, and the speed at which contagion from its failure spread – not just within the US banking system, where deposits flowed out of the regional banking sector and into the big banks and money market funds, but also across the Atlantic – is a major lesson from the episode.


It underscored how exposed banking systems are in a digital age, where deposits can be withdrawn and transferred with a few clicks on a mobile phone, and how interconnected and vulnerable the global banking sector is while the traumas of 2008 linger in depositors’ memories.

While Lonsdale had a relatively easy time at the AFR’s summit, US regulators weren’t treated as gently when they appeared before a congressional banking committee in the US Senate in a hearing that again exposed how dysfunctional the US political system is, and how unlikely it is that the obvious responses to the bank failures will be implemented.

No one is arguing against the proposition that the root cause of Silicon Valley’s failure was, as the Federal Reserve Board’s vice-chair for supervision Michael Barr said, a “textbook case of mismanagement”.

The bank didn’t manage the risk of the concentration risk in its deposit base – dominated by tech companies – nor the interest rate risk in its liabilities even though the Fed’s staff had been discussing these risks with the bank since late 2021.

That also says something about the quality of the Fed’s regulation, but the rolling back of some Dodd-Frank banking reforms by the Trump administration in 2019 as part of its war on regulation – the capital and liquidity requirements for banks with less than $US250 billion of assets were lightened, as was their supervision – meant the bank wasn’t subject to the liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding requirements larger banks have to observe, and it didn’t have to hold capital against any unrealised losses on the securities it held.

Had the deregulationists in the Republican Party and within the Fed – the then vice-chair for supervision Randal Quarles led the charge – got their way, even those US banks of global systemic importance would have seen their regulation weakened.

Barr’s immediate predecessor and Joe Biden’s recently appointed senior economic adviser Lael Brainard was a lone and lonely dissenting voice within the Fed. Her opposition is credited with having a major influence in the failed attempt to deregulate the major US banks.

Proponents of deregulation of banks (the Republicans at Tuesday’s hearing remain opposed to increased regulation) want to generate greater economic growth by encouraging the banks to lend more and accept more risk. In the US, the regional banks lobby and its hold on the conservatives in Congress is powerful.

The regional banks dominate commercial and residential property lending and account for about half non-property-related commercial and consumer lending in the US. The contagion that spread from the collapse of Silicon Valley in particular threatened to infect the core of the US financial system and economy, hence the unwillingness of the regulators to allow the failed banks to fail completely.

The US banks that fell over were, by most definitions, small enough to be allowed to fail, but the threat of contagion meant that even a bank below the cut-off point of $US250 billion of assets that the US used to separate the more intrusively regulated banks from the rest could, and did, cause a threat to systemic and economic stability.

In Switzerland, while Credit Suisse had solid capital and liquidity levels, they weren’t sufficient for the bank to withstand the run that developed as depositors (and hedge funds and short sellers) searched for the most vulnerable of the major banks. With assets equivalent to about 69 per cent of Switzerland’s GDP, it was too big to be allowed to fail.


Now Switzerland will have one dominant bank, holding assets that are more than two-and-a-half times the size of its economy. If UBS were to fail, Switzerland would be devastated, with massive consequences elsewhere.

That’s a conundrum the Swiss regulators are now confronted with. They have to ensure that UBS is incapable of failing, which implies draconian regulation and supervision.

The Credit Suisse experience, moreover, will cause the global regulators and their domestic counterparts to re-think how they should deal with banks that are either of global or domestic systemic importance. The mechanisms for resolving the failure of a bank deemed too big to fail were, as the Swiss authorities have said, shown to be useless at their first real stress test.

Credit Suisse’s total failure and wind-up would have destroyed Switzerland and triggered another global financial crisis.

Regulators are now going to have to rethink their approach to dealing with banks that are so big and complicated that they can’t be allowed to fail. One obvious option, and one the Swiss might exercise in relation to UBS, would be to ensure that they aren’t so big and complicated.

The Business Briefing newsletter delivers major stories, exclusive coverage and expert opinion. Sign up to get it every weekday morning.

Blog: Members of U.S. Senate panel press financial regulators on massive … – Idaho Capital Sun

Blog: Bank of England Issues Updated Assessment of Climate-Related … – JD Supra

The Bank of England released a report titled Climate-Related Risks and the Regulatory Capital Framework (Report) on March 13, 2023. The Report expands on the Bank’s 2021 Climate Change Adaptation Report (CCAR), in which it articulated initial views on existing regulatory capital frameworks for banks and insurers in relation to climate change. The CCAR concluded that the frameworks already in place, such as then-existing capital models and credit ratings, captured climate-related risks “to some extent.” The Bank’s updated assessment as set forth in the Report adopts a more cautious tone, concluding that the risk assessment “may be incomplete due to the difficulties in estimating climate risks (capability gaps) and there may be challenges in capturing risks in the existing capital regimes (regime gaps).”


According to the Report, these existing “capability and regime gaps” create uncertainty around whether banks and insurers are capitalized sufficiently for risks of climate-related losses in the future. The Bank observed that this uncertainty represents a “risk appetite challenge” for regulators, who “need to form judgements on whether quantified and unquantified risks are within acceptable risk levels.” The Bank also stated that effective risk-management controls can reduce “the quantum of capital required in the future for resilience” to climate change losses, but “the absence of controls might suggest a greater quantum of capital will be required.” In the short term, “the Bank is focused on ensuring firms make progress to address ‘capability gaps’ to improve their identification, measurement and management of climate risks.” The Bank will undertake further analysis to explore whether changes to regulatory capital frameworks will be required. In particular the Bank will: develop its capabilities and forward-looking tools to determine the resilience of the financial system to climate risks; support initiatives to enhance climate disclosures; promote high quality and consistent accounting for climate risks; and address material regime gaps in capital frameworks.

Taking The Temperature: The Bank is focused on ensuring that climate change risks and the opportunities that may arise from a transition to a net-zero economy are being identified and managed across the financial sector. Instead of proposing any specific policy changes, the Report paves the way for further work by the Bank to explore and determine what changes (if any) need to be made to existing regulatory capital frameworks. The Report recognized that the “unique characteristics of climate risks mean that their capture by capital frameworks requires a more forward-looking approach than used for many other risks. Scenario analysis and stress testing will play a key role in this.” The emphasis on scenario analysis in conjunction with overall risk assessment mirrors the importance placed on such exercises by other financial regulators, including the Federal Reserve and the European Banking Authority. Financial institutions should also note the Bank’s conclusion that increased capital requirements may be needed to address any absence of controls: because the Bank, like the European Parliament and national bank regulators elsewhere, have highlighted the use of the Basel III regime to address material climate risks, the Bank or the Prudential Regulation Authority very well could take action to address any significant capital or supervisory weaknesses.

Blog: Daily Financial Regulation Update — Saturday, March 25, 2023 … – JD Supra

Major Developments


U.S. Senate

Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

Banking Committee Republicans Probe Federal Reserve Supervision of SVB

March 24, 2023

Members of the Senate Banking Committee Republicans are demanding answers and seeking records from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco regarding their supervision of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in the leadup to its failure.

U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on Financial Services

Barr, Huizenga, Kim Demand Clarity on Federal Reserve Supervisory Activity Preceding Recent Bank Failures

March 24, 2023

The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Bill Huizenga (MI-04), the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Andy Barr (KY-06), and Congresswoman Young Kim (CA-40) sent a letter to Vice Chair for Supervision of the Federal Reserve Michael Barr and President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Mary Daly expressing concern about supervisory activity conducted prior to the collapse of SVB.

Barr, Huizenga Demand Information on Financial Stability Oversight Council Meeting Following Recent Bank Failures

March 24, 2023

The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Bill Huizenga (MI-04), and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Andy Barr (KY-06), sent letters to Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) Chair Janet Yellen and Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight, Richard Delmar, demanding information on a March 12 meeting of FSOC regarding turbulence in the banking system.

Members of the House Financial Services Committee Demand California and New York Regulators Provide Information on Supervisory Efforts Surrounding Recent Bank Failures

March 24, 2023

House Financial Services Committee members are demanding the California and New York state-level regulators that supervised SVB and Signature Bank provide information regarding their supervisory efforts, coordination with Federal regulators, and decision making regarding the failed banks.

Federal Agencies

U.S. Department of the Treasury

Remarks by U.S. Treasurer Chief Lynn Malerba at a White House and U.S. Mint Event Honoring the American Women Quarters Program

March 24, 2023

U.S. Treasurer Chief Lynn Malerba gave remarks at a White House and U.S. Mint Event honoring the American Women Quarters Program.

Treasury Targets Belarusian State-Owned Enterprises, Government Officials, and Lukashenka’s Aircraft

March 24, 2023

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating three entities and nine individuals, and identifying one presidential aircraft, as blocked property.

Federal Reserve Board

Federal Reserve Board releases annual audited financial statements

March 24, 2023

The Federal Reserve on Friday released the 2022 combined annual audited financial statements for the Reserve Banks.

Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Financial Statements as of and for the Years Ended December 31, 2022 and 2021, and Independent Auditors’ Reports

March 24, 2023

The Office of Inspector General for the Federal Reserve released the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council financial statements as of and for the years ended December 31, 2022 and 2021, and independent auditors’ reports.

Federal Reserve publishes order denying application by Custodia Bank, Inc. to be supervised by the Federal Reserve

March 24, 2023

The Federal Reserve published its order denying the application by Custodia Bank, Inc. to be supervised by the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve previously announced its denial of the application, and its order is now available following a review for confidential information.

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Underlying Inflation Gauge – March 2023

March 24, 2023

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York released the Underlying Inflation Gauge (UIG) for March 2023.

Blog: The New York Fed DSGE Model Forecast—March 2023

March 24, 2023

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York published a blog post entitled, “The New York Fed DSGE Model Forecast—March 2023.”

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

OCC Appoints Six New Members to Mutual Savings Association Advisory Committee

March 24, 2023

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) appointed six new members to its Mutual Savings Association Advisory Committee.

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Remarks of Commissioner Summer K. Mersinger at the International Women of Blockchain 2023 Web3 and Metaverse Conference

March 24, 2023

Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Commissioner Summer K. Mersinger gave remarks at the International Women of Blockchain 2023 Web3 and Metaverse Conference.

Financial Stability Oversight Council

Financial Stability Oversight Council Meeting

March 24, 2023

U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen convened a meeting of the FSOC.

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

FinCEN Issues Initial Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Guidance

March 24, 2023

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network published its first set of guidance materials to aid the public, and in particular the small business community, in understanding upcoming beneficial ownership information reporting requirements taking effect on January 1, 2024.

Fannie Mae

Commentary: Banking System Instability May Prove Catalyst for Recession

March 24, 2023

The Fannie Mae Economic and Strategic Research Group released its monthly commentary which projects a modest recession to begin in the second half of 2023, compared to the previously forecasted second quarter of 2023.


European Commission

EU-UK relations: Joint Committee adopts new Windsor Framework arrangements and Partnership Council looks to the future

March 24, 2023

The tenth meeting of the EU-UK Joint Committee and the second meeting of the EU-UK Partnership Council took place in London. The Joint Committee adopted a decision laying down the arrangements relating to the Windsor Framework.

European Banking Authority

EBA consults on standards for supervisors assessing the new market risk internal models under the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book

March 24, 2023

The European Banking Authority launched a public consultation on its draft Regulatory Technical Standards on the assessment methodology under which competent authorities verify institutions’ compliance with the requirements applicable to their internal models under the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book rules.

Bank of England

Market Participants Survey results – March 2023

March 24, 2023

The Bank of England released the results of the Market Participants Survey for March 2023.

Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility: Gilt Sales

March 24, 2023

The Bank of England issued a market notice setting out the schedule for sales in Q2 2023 of gilts held in the Asset Purchase Facility for monetary policy purposes.

Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority

UK Financial Conduct Authority

Joint HM Treasury and FCA statement on the Criminal Market Abuse Regime

March 24, 2023

HM Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority have completed a review of the criminal market abuse regime, fulfilling the commitment made in the Economic Crime Plan 2019-22.

Administration Changes


Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

  • Vice Chair – Vacant (Vice Chair Leal Brainard resigned effective on or around February 20, 2023)

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

  • Comptroller – Vacant (Michael Hsu serves as Acting Comptroller)

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

  • Director – Vacant (Himamauli Das serves as Acting Director)

Appointments/Confirmation Hearings

U.S. Department of the Treasury – Janet Yellen (effective January 26, 2021)

Federal Reserve Board – Jerome H. Powell (effective May 23, 2022)

Federal Reserve Bank of New York – John C. Williams (effective June 18, 2018)

Federal Reserve Bank of Boston – Susan M. Collins (effective July 1, 2022)

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – Martin Gruenberg (effective January 5, 2023)

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency – Michael Hsu (acting Comptroller, effective May 10, 2021)

Securities and Exchange Commission – Gary Gensler (effective April 17, 2021)

Commodity Futures Trade Commission – Rostin Behnam (effective December 17, 2021)

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau – Rohit Chopra (effective October 12, 2021)

National Credit Union Administration – Todd M. Harper (effective January 20, 2021)

Small Business Administration – Isabella Casillas Guzman (effective March 16, 2021)

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development – Marcia Fudge (effective March 10, 2021)

Federal Housing Finance Agency – Sandra L. Thompson (effective June 22, 2022)

U.S. Department of Education – Dr. Miguel Cardona (effective March 2, 2021)

PH Client Alerts

Click here to read more from our Coronavirus series.

Legislation/Legislative Updates

Click here to view the full text of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”), Enacted March 27, 2020.

Click here to view the full text of the Paycheck Protection Program Increase Act of 2020, Enacted April 24, 2020.

Click here to view the full text of the Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, Enacted June 5, 2020.

Click here to view the full text of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Enacted December 27, 2020.

Click here to view the full text of the American Rescue Plan of 2021, Enacted March 11, 2021.

Click here to view the full text of the PPP Extension Act of 2021, Enacted March 30, 2021.

Click here to view a running list of proposed legislation from the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, House Committee on Financial Services, and House Committee on Small Business.